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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

The Credit Union, after it had completed a non-judicial
foreclosure of a Trust Deed on real property taken by it as
primary security for a loan made to Phillips, and after the
statutory time had elapsed for the Credit Union to sue Phillips
for a deficiency, refused to reassign to Phillips a certain real
estate mortgage and note due Phillips, together with all amounts
due or to become due thereon, which Phillips had initially given
to the Credit Union as additional security for said loan.

The

real property in said note and mortgage due Phillips being
entirely different than that real property covered in the Trust
Deed given the Credit Union by Phillips as primary security upon
which said Credit Union foreclosed non-judicially.

Phillips

thereafter brought this action to compel the Credit Union to
reassign to Phillips said real estate mortgage and note given as
additional security.

Phillips further sought to compel the Credit

Union to pay over to him the amount of $27,800, which had been
paid on said promissory note and mortgage assigned as additional
security to the escrow agent collecting for Phillips on said Note.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Phillips filed a motion for partial summary judgment to
have the note, mortgage and proceeds due and to become due thereon
reassigned to him and the District Court granted his Motion for
Summary Judgment.

At the same time the Credit Union made a similar motion for
summary judgment and the same was denied.
The Credit Union, after entry of the Order on summary
judgment adverse to it, filed an interlocutory appeal to this
Court, which refused to hear the same and remanded the case to the
District Court.
Phillips proceeded to enforce the summary judgment granted
him and had the mortgage and note reassigned to him and collected
all the funds owing to him thereon.
That the District Court subsequently heard the matters
remaining to be tried relating to damages and attorney fees
claimed by Phillips, and the Court denied Phillips's claims
therefor.

The Credit Union thereafter appealed the first Order

granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTS
The Credit Union, on or about the 18th day of November,
1980, loaned $150,000 to Phillips and took as security therefor a
Trust Deed and Note covering real property located in Tooele
County, Utah.

As additional security, Phillips assigned to the

Credit Union a promissory note and mortgage due him covering
different property than that described in the Trust Deed and Note
given by Phillips to the Credit Union as primary security.

Phillips

thereafter failed to make the payments to the Credit Union as
required by the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, given it as

(2)

primary security, and as a result thereof the Credit Union sold
the property described on the Trust Deed taken by it as

primary

security for the loan at a non-judicial foreclosure sale in Tooele
County on the 29th day of April, 1986.

That subsequent to said

non-judicial foreclosure sale of said property

the Credit Union

failed to sue Phillips for a deficiency judgment within the
statutory time required by §57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Volume 6A, as amended.

Subsequent to said time running, Phillips

requested that the Credit Union reassign to him his note and
mortgage that he had given to the Credit Union as additional
security for the loan, together with any and all proceeds due or
to become due thereon, and the Credit Union declined to honor
Phillips request-

Phillips thereafter sued the Credit Union for

return of said documents together with all proceeds due and to
become due thereon. Thereafter, the Credit Union filed an
interlocutory appeal and the Supreme Court refused to hear the
same and remanded the case to the lower court to resolve the
remaining issue, to-wit: damages, if any, suffered by Phillips
because of the Credit Union's

refusal to deliver the documents in

question, together with the funds represented thereby and said
District Court, after a hearing on the issue of damages, denied
Phillips claim therefor.
All of the foregoing facts are admitted by the Credit
Union's pleadings on file.

(3)

SUMMARY ARGUMENT
The Credit Union failed to initiate a suit for a deficiency
judgment against Phillips within the time frame allowed by
§57-1-32, supra, which allows three months from the date a
non-judicial sale to establish a deficiency, if any.

Thus, the

total debt due to the Credit Union was extinguished on the date
that the time ran for it to sue for a deficiency.
ARGUMENT
The facts admitted by the Credit Union in this case show
that its trustee sold the property described in the Trust Deed in
question at a non-judicial sale on April 29, 1986, and that said
trustee bid on said property at said sale the sum of $90,000, an
amount less than the total claimed to be due and owing by Phillips
to the Credit Union at said time.

That subsequent to the date of

sale, the Credit Union's trustee caused the real property being
the subject matter of the non-judicial foreclosure sale to be
transferred to the Credit Union.
to-wit:

That after the sale date,

April 29, 1986, more than three (3) months elapsed,

during which the Credit Union failed to file an action to
establish a deficiency judgment against Phillips as required by
§57-1-32, supra.
In order for the Credit Union to establish Phillips
liability for any additional amounts due, it was required to
comply strictly with the requirements of §57-1-32, supra, and in

(4)

the event the Credit Union failed to comply with said section it
is precluded from pursuing any other remedy,

§57-1-32, supra,

gave the Credit Union one remedy and one remedy only, and its
failure to comply therewith prohibits it from collecting
additional funds from Phillips from any sources whatsoever.
Because the Credit Union failed to establish a deficiency amount
due and owing to it during the period of time allowed by the
statute, any debt that might have been established to be due the
Credit Union was automatically extinguished by the time running as
provided by the statute and no money was thereafter due it from
Phillips.
The Credit Union elected to proceed under the statute in
question and cannot now abandon said statute in an attempt to
collect on some other theory.

To allow such would deprive

Phillips of the opportunity to protect and defend his rights under
the statute and it would allow all creditors in the Credit Union's
position to overreach and treat their debtors unfairly, Concepts,
Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158,
1160-61 (Utah, 1987).
§57-1-32, supra, is clear and unequivocal and provides that
the Credit Union must within three (3) months after the
non-judicial sale of real property under a trust deed, file an
action to establish a deficiency against Phillips.

Said statute

further requires that the complaint must set forth specific

(5)

allegations as follows, to-wit:

the entire amount of the

indebtedness, the amount for which such property was sold at the
non-judicial sale, and what the party attempting to attain a
deficiency believes the fair market value of the property sold was
at the date of said sale.

Said statute further provides that the

Court before rendering judgment shall find the fair market value
of the property at the date it was sold and said Court may not
render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of
indebtedness, with interest, costs and expenses of sale, including
trustee and attorney fees, exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761
P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah, 1988).

The Credit Union failed to do

any of the foregoing and therefore it is not entitled to any
deficiency because it failed to establish one as required by law.
The statute in question was interpreted in Cox v Green, 696
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985), wherein this Supreme Court stated that the
statute provided the exclusive remedy for securing a deficiency
judgment following a non-judicial sale of real property under a
trust deed thereby precluding the pursuance of any other remedy
once the sale has been made.
In the instant case the purchase of the Tooele property by
the Credit Union's trustee at the non-judicial foreclosure sale
and the subsequent failure of the Credit Union to file suit for a
deficiency within the time period allowed by statute constituted

(6)

an acceptance by the Credit Union of the property foreclosed upon
as full settlement of any indebtedness due the Credit Union from
Phillips.

The transaction under the statute amounts to nothing

more than the Credit Union accepting the property as payment in
full for the debt as if Phillips had written a check for the full
amount claimed to be due and owing to Credit Union on the
indebtedness at the time of the sale.
The other matters raised by the Credit Union in its brief
are irrelevant to the issue on appeal in this case.
CONCLUSION
In this case the Credit Union failed to comply with the
statutory requirements relating to non-judicial foreclosure sales
as said statute pertains to deficiency judgments and by reason
thereof the Credit Union f s appeal must also fail and the judgment
of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of February, 1990.
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